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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) 
is a growing phenomenon in Latin America and globally.
1
 
Within the Western Hemisphere, PMSCs assist International 
Organizations during humanitarian operations, as in Haiti 
after the massive earthquake. Simultaneously, these 
companies provide intelligence, logistic and training to 
support the Colombian Army. Contractors are also working 
for other private enterprises providing security services in 
risky situations all around the region. The privatization of 
security activities produces binary effects: it exacerbates 
tensions between international interventions and the local 
population as well as erodes State control over security 
issues.  
 
The growing use of PMSCs by the extractive industry in 
Latin America has negatively impacted relations between 
multinational companies and the local population. As a 
byproduct, the privatization of humanitarian aid militarizes 
security provision in the public sphere and can create 
tensions between international actors and the local 
population.
2
 Also, PMSCs reduce State control over security 
issues, particularly in conflict situations like Colombia, 
where PMSCs are active in the fight against drug trafficking. 
In both situations, more control over PMSC‟s activities is 
needed.   There are several international initiatives that aim 
to improve the regulation of PMSCs activities and that could 
be used to improve local control. Finally, the U.S.  as the 
major hiring and provider of contracted PMSC, has an 
interest and important responsibility in the regulation of  
                                                             
1
 P. W. Singer, Corporatewarriors: the rise of the privatized military 
industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
2
 P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005, pp. 
125. 
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these companies working in Latin America – or contracting 
Latin American employees for missions elsewhere.
3 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The massive earthquake that rocked Haiti on 12 January 
2010 created a tremendous demand for humanitarian 
assistance. The chaos resulting from the complete 
destruction of the infrastructures in Port-au-Prince and the 
huge number of victims complicated the relief efforts 
enormously. Private military and security companies 
(PMSCs) saw in this situation the possibility to offer their 
services to States or international organizations in order to 
facilitate the humanitarian aid efforts. While Haiti offers a 
recent example of the use of private security, PMSCs also 
work in radically different contexts, as for instance in Peru 
where a local company provides security to international 
extractive industry.  
 
PMSC can be defined as “corporations offering security, 
defence and/or military services to States, international 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private 
companies and/or armed groups. These services include 
armed guarding and protection of persons and objects or 
buildings, maintenance and operation of weapons systems, 
prisoner detention and interrogation, intelligence, risk 
assessment and military research analysis, as well as advice 
to or training of local forces and security personnel.”3 
 
PMSC are present throughout Latin America. In 2009, more 
than 20 United States (U.S.) companies were providing 
intelligence, logistic or training in Colombia. DynCorp, for 
instance, has been active in Colombia since the beginning of 
the 1990s. PMSCs also work in Peru, Bolivia or Mexico in 
the war against narco-trafficking. Additionally, Chileans and 
other Latin-American contractors are recruited by U.S. 
                                                             
3
 F. Francioni & N. Ronziti, War by Contract (London, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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PMSCs to work in other countries, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 
All these international security tasks were once provided by 
the host country public armed forces. This privatization of 
security results in the presence of a non-State actor 
conducting law enforcement in contexts where once only 
States had jurisdiction. 
 
In the first part of the paper, we will examine how the 
growing use of PMSCs by the extractive industry in Latin 
America has a negative effect on the relations between 
multinational companies and local population. Additionally, 
the privatization of humanitarian interventions results in the 
militarization of public security in a way that has created 
tensions between international organizations and the local 
populations. 
 
In a second part, the lessened control by States on security 
issues will be analyzed, particularly in the context of 
conflict. For instance, the use of PMSCs by the government 
of the U.S. in the Colombian is especially relevant. Even 
when the U.S. Congress prohibits U.S. direct participation in 
the conflict, in some situations the PMSCs have engaged in 
direct confrontations with Colombian subversive groups. In 
both their domestic and international, more control over 
PMSC‟s activities is necessary.  
 
The third part of the paper will provide an overview of the 
different international initiatives that aim to improve the 
regulation of PMSCs activities and should be used to 
improve domestic oversight. Finally, we will analyze the role 
of the U.S. As the major hiring and home to a significant 
amount of contracted PMSCs, the U.S. has both an important 
responsibility and an interest in the regulation of these 
5 
 
companies working in Latin America – or contracting Latin 
American employees for missions elsewhere. 
 
PMSCS  EXACERBATE  TENSIONS 
The increase in the privatization of security in Latin America 
and the lack of oversight for PMSC activities during 
peacetime or humanitarian interventions complicates 
relations between local population and international actors. 
 
PMSC AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY 
The emerging trend of PMSCs protecting multinational 
extractive corporations in Latin America has been 
accompanied by harmful consequences for human rights 
among local populations, which then harms the image of 
multinational corporations in the region. The increased use 
of PMSCs by multinational extractive corporations in 
complex environments in Latin America has triggered 
increased mobilization against those same corporations by 
local activists and decreased the legitimacy of their 
governments. One of the biggest challenges for these 
corporations is to interact with the local culture in order to be 
able to provide security for their employees while abiding by 
respect for human right obligations.  These obligations have 
been defined by the United Nations (UN) Special 
Representative, Professor John Ruggie, Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General on human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
in a UN framework titled, “Protect, Respect and Remedy”.4 
                                                             
4
 All the information about the work of the Special Representative of the 
United Nations Secretary-General on business & human rights, John 
Ruggie is available at the portal  
http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home. 
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In order to fulfill the first task, several corporations contract 
international or local PMSCs.
5
 PMSC managers are, in most 
of cases, ex-militaries or ex-police officers and are very well 
connected with the public sector and law enforcement. Their 
primary function is to provide information for multinational 
extractive corporations in order to help their installation in 
the country. Only a few PMSCs have the capacity to collect 
field information. In most of the cases PMSCs employees‟ 
connections guarantee excellent access tithe intelligence of 
the country that they work in. 
 
Problems appear most often when PMSCs provide protection 
for the installation of the extractive corporation. According 
to F. Cafferata, contracting police officers is the main 
problem “due to the fact that police forces throughout Latin 
America face poor working conditions. This problem 
contributes to a blurring of the frontiers between public and 
private security.”6 
 
PMSCs also contract former militaries and who are often 
predisposed to apply the same methods used in their previous 
work. The use of military methods for security in the public 
sphere during peacetime creates conditions ripe for human 
rights infractions by security providers. The example of the 
PMSC Forza in Peru illustrates these challenges well. Forza 
was created in 1991 by a group of marine officers to offer 
services of corporative security. They operate at the national 
level and specialize in the extractive and industrial sector.
7
 
On August 2006, during a protest, two environmental rights 
                                                             
5
 We can mention as local example the Peruvian PMSC Forza or as 
international example the British PMSC Team Savant working in 
Colombia. 
6
 F. Cafferata, Privatisation of Security in Latin America: Review, 
Working Papers Series, no. 3, June 2010, Global Consortium on Security 
Transformation, p. 4. Available at: 
http://www.securitytransformation.org/gc_publications.php. 
7
La República, December 6, 2006, p. 3. 
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defenders were killed by the Yanacocha mine‟s security 
forces. The investigation reveals that the perpetrators were 
three police officers who served on their days off as private 
security guards in Forza.
8
 The Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) Education and Action for Sustainable 
Development Group (GRIFUDES – in Spanish), founded by 
Father Marco Arana, is active in the region of the Yanacocha 
mine. This NGO and other community leaders in Cajamarca 
(Peru) have been subject to serious intimidation and 
surveillance by the PMSC Forza. The National Human 
Rights Coordinator (CNDDHH in Spanish) has recorded 20 
incidents, which occurred between August and November 
2006 against personnel of GRUFIDES, and at the moment 
the authorities have not conducted a full investigation.
9
 
 
Other cases should also be mentioned. For instance, a 
Chilean PMSC contracted by a forestry corporation was 
involved in incidents against the Mapuche indigenous 
community in the South of the country.
10
In Ecuador, the 
Copper Mesa Mining Corporation used private forces to 
attack and try to dislocate the Junín community.
11
 In 
                                                             
8
 A. Benavides de Perez, “Mercenarios, Mercenarismo y Privatización de 
la Seguridad en America Latina,” in A. Perret, (ed.) Mercenarios Y 
Compañías Militares y de Seguridad Privadas: Dinámicas y Retos Para 
América Latina, (Universidad Externado de Colombia: Bogotá, 2010), 
p117-118. 
9
 For more information on the case and the answer of the corporation 
implicated, visit the webpage of Business and Human Rights Resource 
Center at http://www.business-humanrights.org; see also United Nations, 
Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Mission to 
Peru, document, A/HRC/7/7/Add.2. 
10
 For more information see United Nations, Report of the Working 
Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Mission to Chile, document, 
A/HRC/6/12/Add.4. 
11
 For more information see the webpage of Business and Human Rights 
Resource Center at http://www.business-humanrights.org; see also the 
webpage of the Ecuadorian NGO Decoinhttp://www.decoin.org/ and the 
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Guatemala, a similar case implicated the Canadian mining 
company Goldcorp in a violation of human rights against the 
local population.
12
 The use of PMSC by multinational 
extractive corporations aggravates the complicated 
relationship between multinational corporations (MNCs) and 
local populations. To avoid this effect, MNCs need to 
monitor the adherence to human rights standards by security 
forces to protect their image both domestically and 
internationally.  
 
PMSC USE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Ten years ago, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested 
that the world was not ready to privatize peace;
13
 however 
PMSCs are now active in the majority of peacekeeping 
operations and humanitarian interventions, mostly because 
states are reluctant to send their soldiers for extended periods 
of time. For instance PMSCs were contracted in Haiti to 
provide security services for the protection of different 
organizations working in the country. But as authors A. 
Buzatu and B. Buckland argue,  
 
Humanitarian organizations often require additional 
security in order to perform their missions. While 
most private security companies hired by 
humanitarian organizations are unarmed, in some 
exceptional cases armed security is provided. It is 
clear that this is a growing trend, with more and 
                                                                                                                            
decision of  the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 11.03.2011 available at 
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2011/2011ONCA0191.pdf.  
12
 For more information see the webpage of Business and Human Rights 
Resource Center at http://www.business-humanrights.org. 
13
Kofi Annan, 35th Ditchley Foundation Lecture, 26 June 1998, UN 
Press Release SG/SM/6613. 
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more organizations in the field hiring mostly local 
private security guards.”14 
 
As it is the case of PMSC used by multinational 
corporations, the presence of ex-militaries providing public 
security as a form of humanitarian assistance without 
adequate accountability is not always helpful in complex 
environments. This can harm the relation between the 
international intervention and the local population. 
According to Du Plessis, “there is also a risk of severe 
reputational damage arising from an incident, undermining 
the agency‟s credibility and reducing its access to the local 
population and its ability to perform humanitarian 
missions.”15 
 
Headquarters Location of Companies in 
Peacekeeping Operations 
 
United States 47.6 % 
European Union 38.1 % 
Cyprus 9.5 % 
France 4.7 % 
Hungary 4.7 % 
Italy 4.7 % 
Spain 4.7 % 
Sweden 4.7 % 
United Kingdom 4.7 % 
Others14.3 % 
 
Source: 
http://peaceops.org/poi/images/stories/poi_rp_industrysurvey2007.pdf. 
                                                             
14A. Buzatu& B. Buckland, “Private Military & Security Companies: 
Future Challenges in Security Governance,” DCAF Horizon 2015, 
Working Paper n°3, 2010. 
15
 A.Du Plessis, “The Global Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Companies: why it matters to humanitarian organisations,” Humanitarian 
Exchange Magazine, Issue 47, June 2010. 
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In Latin America, the case of Haiti exemplifies these 
challenges. The massive earthquake that rocked Haiti on 12 
January 2010 created a tremendous demand for humanitarian 
assistance. The chaos resulting from the complete 
destruction of the infrastructure in Port-au-Prince and the 
huge number of victims complicated the relief efforts 
enormously. In this context some PMSCs were contracted by 
States or international organizations to provide security or 
other services to help Haitian people to rebuild the country. 
For instance, the PMSC Triple Canopy
16
 oversaw a refugee 
camp;
17
 The PMSC Raidon Tactics
18
 has at least 30 former 
soldiers of U.S. special operations in Haiti who have been 
guarding aid convoys and providing security for news 
agencies.
19
 
 
At the moment, there is no real complaint against PMSCs in 
the Haitian case, but criticism has been made regarding the 
contribution of these companies. The previous presence of 
United Nations forces on the field and the fact that the 
population remained very calm despite the situation, limit the 
need for external security interventions.
20
 However, concerns 
exist because in the case of company misconduct, the 
questions of who bears their responsibility remain unclear, 
and in spite of “these concerns, suggestions have been made 
for the expanded use of PMSCs, such as employing them as 
                                                             
16
http://www.triplecanopy.com/triplecanopy/en/home/.  
17M. Jayanti, “Providing Cover,”Journal of International Peace 
Operations, vol. 5, N°6, May-June2010, p.10-12. 
18
http://www.raidontactics.com/. 
19
 A. Fenton,“Private Contractors 'Like Vultures Coming to Grab the 
Loot'”,IPS News,February 27, 2010, accessed February 12, 
2011,http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50396.  
20
 UNHCR protection officer by phone,(A. Perret, Interviewer) 
February13, 2011,Port-au-Prince, Haiti. 
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UN Blue Helmets or even as UN-mandated or UN-led troops 
carrying out military operations.”21 
 
EROSION OF STATE CONTROL OVER SECURITY 
FORCES 
The second most important effect of the privatization is the 
erosion of the capacity of the State to control public security 
or military issues. This is evident in the current war on drugs 
in Mexico and Central America, but also in the specific 
context of Colombia.  
 
DRUG WAR IN MEXICO 
The Mexican Drug War is taking place among rival drug 
cartels and Mexican forces for regional control. The violence 
has escalated dramatically in the last few years and in 2010 
more than 12,000 people were killed.
22
 The U.S.is 
supporting the Mexican government in its fight against drug 
cartels, and part of the support is privatized: PMSCs provide 
training to Mexican police. Other U.S. PMSCs are active in 
Mexico, offering different services linked to “risk 
management" contracts sought by individuals and 
multinational companies.
23
 In both uses of the PMSCs, State 
control the security situation is decreasing while not showing 
improvements. 
 
According to the U.S. Department of State, “the U.S. 
Congress has appropriated $1.5 billion since the Mérida 
                                                             
21
 S. Chesterman&A. Fisher, Private Security, Public Order, The 
Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (Oxford University Press: 
New York, 2009), p. 6. 
22“Mexico's drug war: Number of dead passes 30,000,”BBC news, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12012425.  
23
 N. Miroff, “As kidnappings for ransom surge in Mexico, victims' 
families and employers turn to private U.S. firms instead of law 
enforcement,” Washington Post, February 26, 2011. 
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Initiative began in fiscal year 2008” and “the United States is 
supporting Mexico‟s implementation of comprehensive 
justice sector reforms through the training of justice sector 
personnel including police, prosecutors, and defenders, 
correction systems development, judicial exchanges, and 
partnerships between Mexican and U.S. law 
schools.”24However, part of the U.S. support has been 
privatized and some journalists have accused employees of 
PMSCs‟ of training Mexican police in torture techniques.25 
Considering that the lack of trust of the Mexican population 
in law enforcement is one of the important problems at hand, 
the use of PMSCs – which are by nature less controlled than 
public law enforcement – is counterproductive. U.S. 
PMSCs
26
 are also active in Mexico providing kidnapping 
resolution and ransom negotiation services. These companies 
are working for individuals or multinational corporations, 
and they are “generally cooperative with U.S. law 
enforcement […] [they] tend to maneuver as discreetly as 
possible in Mexico, usually avoiding contact with authorities 
who may not be trustworthy.”27 This reinforces the 
                                                             
24
 The Merida Initiative, 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/158009.pdf. 
25
 “One of the videos, obtained by the newspaper El Heraldo de León, 
shows police appearing to squirt water up a man's nose, a torture 
technique once notorious among Mexican police. They then dunk his 
head in a hole that an unidentified voice on the video says is full of 
excrement and rats. In another video, an unidentified English-speaking 
trainer asks a police agent to roll in his own vomit. The English-speaking 
man belonged to a private U.S. security company hired to help train the 
agents.” In Fox News, Report Mexico cop in torture case fired, July 19, 
2008, available 
athttp://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Jul19/0,4675,Me
xicoPoliceTorture,00.html.  
26
 For instance Clayton Consultant, http://www.claytonconsultants.com/.  
27
 N. Miroff, “As kidnappings for ransom surge in Mexico, victims' 
families and employers turn to private U.S. firms instead of law 
enforcement.” February 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022603384.html. 
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conclusion of the previous section; the presence of PMSCs in 
Mexican territory does not contribute to the reinforcement of 
the credibility of the Mexican public forces.  
 
PMSC IN CONFLICT 
The use of PMSCs by the U.S. government in the Colombian 
conflict is particularly relevant to the argument made here 
regarding the sovereign control by States on security issues. 
Since 2002, with the beginning of the Plan Colombia, the 
U.S. State and Defense Departments have contracted PMSCs 
in order to carry out activities related to U.S. military and 
police aid to Colombia.
28
 This use of PMSCs has some 
effects contrary to the objective of Plan Colombia which has 
had limited success, especially in combating drug 
trafficking.
29
 The use of PMSCs has helped with fortifying 
the technical capacity of Colombian law enforcement and 
public security and provides assistance in the difficult task of 
rebuilding the Colombian State‟s legitimacy. However, if 
foreign PMSCs are allowed to operate with absolute 
immunity for their employees and engage directly with the 
population during operations it is likely to harm the mission 
of Plan Colombia.
30
 
 
The loss of State control is primarily evident concerning the 
circumvention of the limitation on direct U.S. participation 
in operations in Colombia: the U.S. Congress prohibits all 
activities that involve direct participation of the U.S. in 
                                                             
28
 The United States Department of State, Report to Congress On Certain 
Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia. Washington, 2010. 
29
 For details on the drug production in Colombia see the UN report: 
“Colombia: monitoreo de cultivos de Coca,” Oficina de las Naciones 
Unidas contra la droga y el delito, junio 2009, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/colombia/es/index.html.  
30
 A. Perret, “Las Compañias Militares y/o de Seguridad Privadas en 
Colombia:¿Una nueva forma de mercenarismo?,” Pretexto n°34 
(Universidad Externado de Colombia: Bogotá, 2009). 
14 
 
combat hostilities. Moreover, the U.S. law limits the 
outsourcing of “inherently governmental functions,”31 in 
other words PMSCs are not authorized to perform functions 
in an area of combat operations.
32
 In spite of this prohibition, 
it is possible to note direct participation of certain US 
PMSCs in the Colombian conflict.
33
For instance DynCorp
34
 
holds a contract with the U.S. State Department to fumigate 
illegal cultivation, but also “training, air transport, aircraft 
maintenance, reconnaissance, and search and rescue 
operations
35
 which are focused on locating and shutting 
down aircrafts or hostile actions taken by drug producers or 
traffickers.”36 During the operations of fumigations, two or 
three combat helicopters accompany the planes
37
 that drop 
the glyphosate, because aircraft attacks are frequent.
38
 
                                                             
31
 “OMB Circular No.A-76: Performance of Commercial Activities,” 
Revised 2003 (Circular A-76) (White House Office of Management and 
Budget, Washington, DC, May 29, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correctio
n. 
32
 See a detailed study of the US Law in Kristine A. Huskey, “The 
American Way: Private Military Contractors & U.S. Law After 9/11,” 
Priv-War national report (European University Institute: Florence, 2010) 
available at http://priv-war.eu. 
33A. Perret, “Las Compañias Militares y/o de Seguridad Privadas en 
Colombia:¿Una nueva  
forma de mercenarismo?” 
34
 http://www.dyn-intl.com/.  
35
DynCorp-State Department Contract, 2001 
inhttp://www.corpwatch.org. 
36
 I. Cabrera, & A. Perret, (2009) Colombia: Regulating Private Military 
and Security Companies in a “Territorial State”, Priv-War National 
Reports, 19/09, European University Institute, Florence, available at 
http://priv-war.eu. 
37
 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO, Drug Control, 
Report to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Caucus on 
International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate(Washington: GAO, 2004), 
p9. 
38
 Between 2001 and 2002, around ten attacks per month took place, 
increasing in 2003 to reach a peak of 73 attacks per month. These 
15 
 
The helicopters “have a mixed crew composed of both 
contractors and members of the National Police,”39 which are 
armed and ready to fire on the aggressors. Even if the 
Colombian National Police is supposed to assume 
responsibility for helicopter gunships, there is no effective 
control of contractors‟ activities. The absence of effective 
control has been corroborated by an anonymous U.S. 
Embassy employee that stated, “The U.S. Embassy, which is 
supposed to be in charge of the following of all the contracts, 
does not effectively oversee DynCorp‟s activities. The 
PMSC is in charge of hiring the employees, and providing 
the necessary material - the U.S. government is interested 
only in outcomes.”40 The Intelligence Authorization Act of 
November 2003
41
 expands the use of PMSC participation in 
the Colombian conflict
42
 because intelligence services can be 
used not only in the fight against drug trafficking but also in 
the fight against terrorism.
43
 This means funds can be used to 
fight irregular groups. 
 
                                                                                                                            
numbers have since decreased and now the average is 26 attacks per 
month. Ibid. p. 1.  
39
 “Mercenarios,” Semana, August 13, 2001, nº1002, Bogotá. Author‟s 
translation. 
40
 Employee of the US Embassy in Bogotá, (A. Perret interviewer) May 
4, 2007, Quoted in I. Cabrera& A. Perret, “Colombia: Regulating Private 
Military and Security Companies in a „Territorial State‟.” 
41
 In its 313th section “use of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism 
activities for Colombia” the act authorizes the use of intelligence funds 
used in counterdrug activities to be used in counterterrorism activities 
against FARC, ELN, and AUC, with the objective of protecting health 
and human life in emergency situations, including rescue operations. 
Senate of the United States of America, FY2004 Intelligence 
Authorization Act. Report, 2003, p108-163. 
42
 Defined as a conflict by the Colombian government in the law “on 
victims” voted by the parliament on May 2011, see: Semana, Ley de 
Victimas, Edición 1517, May 28, 2011. 
43
 C. Veillette, “Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related 
Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance,” Washington: Congressional 
Research Service & The Library of Congress, 2005. 
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The consequences of this lack of control can be dramatic 
considering that US PMSCs‟ employees are granted 
immunity from Colombian jurisdiction by U.S. agreement. 
Such is the case in two incidences of the rape of minors 
involving PMSCs‟ employees. One of them occurred on a 
military base and is under investigation but the justice 
system has its hands tied because of PMSC immunity;
44
 the 
other case was not investigated.
45
 
 
IMPROVING CONTROL: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 
AND NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
This lack of control and accountability of PMSCs has come 
under attack from various sides. During the past five years, 
different international initiatives have emerged and provide a 
starting point to regulate and control PMSCs activities. At 
the international level, in 2005 the United Nations created 
the UN Working Group on Mercenaries to investigate 
mercenaries and their role in violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination. In September 2010, the UN Working Group 
on Mercenaries presented the first draft of a convention to 
the General Assembly. In parallel, another initiative, led by 
Switzerland, has produced two international documents: the 
Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct 
(ICoC). These two initiatives have very different objectives: 
the UN document would become a binding instrument of 
international law, while the so-called “Swiss Initiative” may 
be considered soft-law (Montreux Document) and voluntary 
regulation (ICoC). 
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 “Investigan a dos militares de E.U. por violación de niña de 12 años en 
Comando Aéreo de Melgar.”El Tiempo, October 7, 2007, p 1. 
45
 D. Murcia, Lawyer, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo, (A. 
Perret, Interviewer) Bogotá, October 19, 2007. 
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The first draft convention presented in 2010 at the United 
Nations is the beginning of a new long process. It reaffirms 
the States‟ responsibility of legitimate use of force and 
includes interesting elements on limitation of outsourcing, 
defining inherently States functions. It aims to regulate 
PMSC activities in all types of contexts, not only in conflict 
situations. Nevertheless, the draft convention is currently 
under discussion and its application could still take a long 
time. Therefore, at the moment, the only international 
document that could provide guidance to States and common 
standards to control multinational PMSCs activities is the 
Montreux Document. The United States has participated 
actively in the negotiation of the Montreux Document and is 
part of the 17 nations that have first endorsed the document. 
For these reasons, it is recommended here that the U.S. 
should take the lead to establish accountability and accept 
responsibility for the respect of human rights by U.S.PMSCs. 
 
The application of the Montreux Document is restricted to 
conflict situations and refers mainly to international 
humanitarian law.  It is composed of two main parts, the first 
on pertinent legal obligations regarding PMSCs – „hard‟ 
laws binding under custom or treaty – and the second on 
good practices regarding PMSC – „soft standards‟–. By 
being part of this document, the U.S. abides by and 
recognizes the constraints of immunity in regards to 
contractors and the enforcement of human rights and 
humanitarian law rules. The second part of the Montreux 
Document recommends States to select PMSCs carefully, 
with transparent processes according to criteria that account 
for the past services, background, resources, and personnel 
policies of firms.
46
 
 
The selection of PMSC employees is fundamental,  “in the 
Iraqi context, […] US officials and PMSCs alike often 
                                                             
46
 Montreux Document, part 2, para 2 - 9.  
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encountered difficulties in vetting individuals hired from 
countries in Africa, South America, and elsewhere.”47 This 
problem also concerns Latin America and international 
collaboration is needed. For instance “there was an outcry in 
Chile as well as in the international press when it was 
revealed that several Chilean subcontractors working in Iraq 
were Pinochet-era commandos who had been forced to retire 
from the military for their role in the crimes of that 
regime.”48 
 
On a parallel basis, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs has prepared a PMSC industry follow-up initiative to 
the Montreux Document: the International Code of Conduct 
(ICoC). This code articulates principles for PMSC to operate 
in accordance with international humanitarian law and 
international human rights standards and was signed by 
nearly 60 companies in Geneva on 9 November 2010.
49
 A 
group of stakeholders composed by civil society and industry 
representatives are now preparing external independent 
mechanisms for an effective governance and oversight of the 
ICoC. 
 
Meritorious international initiatives often confront 
difficulties when being implemented and may have different 
impact on the ground. The current base for implementation is 
invariably rooted at the national level. In a world of 
sovereign States, multilateral commitments are only effective 
when given concrete expression in national legislation and 
institutions.  Thus, States have the final responsibility to 
                                                             
47
 C. Spear in, “What Montreux Means: Canada and the New Regulation 
of the International Private Military and Security Industry,” Canadian 
Foreign Policy, Volume 16, 2010, Issue 1, p. 6. 
48
 K. McCoy, “Yesterday‟s Civil Warriors, Today‟s Global Guards: Latin 
Americans in the Privatized Military Industry,” 2010, p154-155, in A. 
Perret, “Mercenarios Y Compañías Militares y de Seguridad Privadas.” 
49
 http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msg-
id=36144. For more information see also: www.icoc-psp.org.  
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regulate and improve control over PMSC.  For this to be 
effective, the States must integrate the context of the 
international initiatives into their own domestic legislation.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The current privatization of the security in Latin America 
entails a risk for the progress of human rights and democratic 
values. As discussed above, the privatization of humanitarian 
interventions and the use of private military and security 
companies (PMSC) by Multinational Corporation tend to 
militarize civilian tasks and complicate relations between 
international organizations and the local population. 
Consequences are negative for local people – who suffer 
human rights violations – and for the companies or 
international organizations that hire these PMSCs – which 
suffer reputational and credibility damage. The privatization 
of military tasks also has implications for the States. During 
armed conflict or drug war, the use of PMSC implies the 
presence of a non-State actor allowed to use force in contexts 
where once only States were allowed to do so. 
 
All of the cases mentioned here demonstrate the need for 
more control and different international initiatives. The UN 
draft convention and the Swiss Initiative composed by the 
Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct 
(ICoC) aim to provide international standards to help States 
to confront these challenges. The three documents are 
complementary but the UN draft convention is still under 
discussion and will probably take time to arrive to its final 
version. Taking into account that the U.S. has already 
endorsed the Montreux Document on PMSCs and is the 
major provider of private security services and personnel in 
the region, it should promote abiding by the human rights 
standards included in the ICoC. Also, it should only contract  
20 
 
signatory PMSCs‟ – and include the code of conduct in the 
contract. The US should also integrate the code into its 
domestic law and require all the U.S. PMSCs to sign it. 
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